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Abstract	  
In	  recent	  years,	  philosophy	  of	  science	  has	  witnessed	  a	  significant	  increase	  in	  attention	  directed	  
toward	  the	  field’s	  social	  relevance.	  	  This	  is	  demonstrated	  by	  the	  formation	  of	  societies	  with	  
related	  agendas,	  the	  organization	  of	  research	  symposia,	  and	  an	  uptick	  in	  work	  on	  topics	  of	  
immediate	  public	  interest.	  	  	  The	  collection	  of	  papers	  that	  follows	  results	  from	  one	  such	  event:	  a	  
three-­‐day	  colloquium	  on	  the	  subject	  of	  socially	  engaged	  philosophy	  of	  science	  held	  at	  the	  
University	  of	  Cincinnati	  in	  October	  2012.	  	  In	  this	  introduction,	  we	  first	  survey	  the	  recent	  history	  
of	  philosophy	  of	  science’s	  social	  involvement	  (or	  lack	  thereof)	  and	  contrast	  this	  with	  the	  much	  
greater	  social	  involvement	  of	  the	  sciences	  themselves	  (Section	  1).	  	  Next,	  we	  argue	  that	  the	  field	  
of	  philosophy	  of	  science	  bears	  a	  special	  responsibility	  to	  contribute	  to	  public	  welfare	  (Section	  
2).	  We	  then	  introduce	  as	  a	  term	  of	  art	  “socially	  engaged	  philosophy	  of	  science”	  and	  articulate	  
what	  we	  take	  to	  be	  distinctive	  about	  social	  engagement,	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  articles	  in	  this	  





philosophy	  of	  science	  and	  suggest	  some	  practical	  steps	  for	  individuals	  and	  institutions	  to	  
support	  this	  trajectory	  (Section	  4).	  
	  
1	  Philosophy	  of	  Science	  and	  Society	  	  
Soon	  after	  it	  was	  founded,	  the	  Philosophy	  of	  Science	  Association	  (PSA)	  was	  far	  more	  politically	  
and	  socially	  oriented	  than	  it	  is	  today.	  	  One	  of	  the	  six	  categories	  suggested	  for	  submissions	  in	  the	  
first	  issue	  of	  the	  Association’s	  journal	  is	  dedicated	  to	  understanding	  the	  “function	  and	  
significance	  of	  science	  within	  various	  contexts”	  (Phil.	  Sci.	  1939,	  vol.	  1,	  p.	  4).	  The	  PSA	  bylaws	  
established	  in	  1948	  are	  clear	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  social	  import	  of	  philosophy	  of	  science.	  	  That	  
document	  states	  that	  the	  field	  should	  aim	  toward	  	  
The	  study	  and	  discussion	  of	  the	  subject	  of	  philosophy	  of	  science,	  broadly	  interpreted,	  
and	  the	  encouragement	  of	  practical	  consequences	  which	  may	  flow	  therefrom	  of	  benefit	  
to	  scientists	  and	  philosophers	  in	  particular	  and	  to	  men	  of	  good	  will	  in	  general	  (Phil.	  Sci.	  
1948,	  vol.	  15,	  p.	  176).	  	  	  
It	  is	  notable	  that	  this	  emphasizes	  the	  practical	  consequences	  of	  philosophy	  of	  science,	  including	  
its	  consequences	  outside	  of	  philosophy.	  Philosophers	  are	  encouraged	  to	  take	  seriously	  the	  
question	  of	  public	  welfare	  and	  to	  embrace	  the	  type	  of	  philosophical	  work	  that	  might	  have	  
tangible	  benefits	  for	  scientists,	  citizens,	  and	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  two.	  	  
As	  recently	  as	  the	  early	  1950s,	  members	  of	  the	  PSA	  were	  encouraged	  to	  improve	  human	  





Reichenbach	  and	  Rudolph	  Carnap,	  the	  founders	  of	  Erkenntnis,	  stressed	  a	  similar	  aim.	  In	  his	  
editorial	  for	  the	  first	  issue	  of	  this	  journal,	  Reichenbach	  invites	  the	  submission	  of	  work	  in	  
scientific	  philosophy	  oriented	  toward	  resolving	  social	  problems	  (Erkenntnis	  1930,	  vol.	  1,	  p.	  1-­‐3).	  
Among	  mathematicians,	  Reichenbach	  is	  known	  especially	  for	  his	  probabilistic	  decision	  theory,	  
which	  grounds	  particular	  statements	  about	  probabilities	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  properties	  of	  random	  
sequences.	  Yet	  it	  is	  notable	  that	  he	  employed	  and	  extended	  this	  highly	  technical	  theory	  in	  order	  
to	  help	  understand	  difficult	  social	  structures	  arising	  from	  the	  demands	  of	  human	  welfare.	  
According	  to	  Reichenbach,	  	  
If	  a	  decision	  is	  not	  made	  by	  one	  person	  but	  by	  a	  body	  of	  persons,	  such	  as	  a	  government,	  
there	  are	  further	  random	  factors	  to	  be	  envisaged...the	  tiredness	  or	  sickness	  of	  leaders;	  
the	  inertia	  of	  bureaucracy;	  the	  pleading	  of	  voices	  of	  people	  frightened	  by	  the	  horrors	  of	  
war.	  All	  these	  factors	  are	  random	  factors	  and	  may	  extend	  in	  a	  positive	  or	  negative	  
direction	  (1949,	  p.6).	  	  
Here,	  Reichenbach	  also	  embraces	  a	  broad	  interpretation	  of	  philosophy	  of	  science,	  for	  he	  
considers	  how	  his	  technical	  work	  might	  be	  applied	  in	  a	  social	  context.	  His	  views	  extend	  beyond	  
the	  fields	  of	  philosophy	  and	  mathematics	  to	  incorporate	  also	  the	  “pleading	  voices	  of	  people.”	  	  
The	  social	  and	  political	  activity	  of	  the	  members	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Circle	  and	  associated	  
philosophers,	  both	  in	  Europe	  in	  the	  interwar	  period	  and	  also	  in	  the	  US	  afterwards,	  is	  by	  now	  
well	  appreciated	  (Friedman	  1991,	  1999;	  Reisch	  2005a,	  2005b;	  Friedman	  and	  Creath	  2007;	  Uebel	  
2009,	  2012).	  	  The	  Vienna	  Circle	  manifesto,	  coauthored	  by	  Carnap,	  Neurath,	  and	  Hahn	  in	  1929,	  is	  





welfare.	  	  The	  “scientific	  conception	  of	  the	  world”	  advocated	  there	  is	  intended	  to	  apply	  quite	  
broadly:	  	  
We	  witness	  the	  spirit	  of	  the	  scientific	  world-­‐conception	  penetrating	  in	  growing	  measure	  
the	  forms	  of	  personal	  and	  public	  life,	  in	  education,	  upbringing,	  architecture,	  and	  the	  
shaping	  of	  economic	  and	  social	  life	  according	  to	  rational	  principles	  (in	  Sarkar	  1996,	  pp.	  
339-­‐40).	  	  	  
This	  conception	  of	  philosophy	  of	  science	  has	  clear	  social	  dimensions.	  	  It	  is	  focally	  concerned	  
with	  improving	  human	  welfare,	  for	  “the	  scientific	  world	  conception	  serves	  life,	  and	  life	  receives	  
it”	  (ibid.,	  p.	  40).	  	  Carnap,	  Hahn,	  and	  Neurath	  held	  a	  view	  of	  philosophy	  of	  science	  according	  to	  
which	  the	  discipline	  plays	  a	  “superstructural”	  role	  in	  society	  that	  has	  significant	  social	  and	  
political	  components	  (Uebel	  2005,	  pp.	  756-­‐7).	  	  In	  their	  view,	  a	  responsible,	  metaphysics-­‐free	  
philosophy	  of	  science	  goes	  hand-­‐in-­‐hand	  with	  particular	  economic,	  political,	  and	  ethical	  ideas.	  	  
Philosophers	  are	  tasked	  with	  articulating	  and	  advocating	  these	  connections,	  as	  scientists	  
themselves	  must	  focus	  their	  energies	  elsewhere.	  	  	  	  
According	  to	  Don	  Howard	  (2003),	  1959	  was	  the	  “watershed”	  year	  for	  philosophy	  of	  
science’s	  withdrawal	  from	  active	  social	  and	  political	  participation.	  This	  was	  the	  year	  that	  the	  
mission	  of	  the	  Philosophy	  of	  Science	  Association	  changed	  dramatically,	  moving	  from	  the	  broad	  
view	  of	  philosophy	  of	  science	  discussed	  above	  to	  a	  narrow	  view,	  one	  aimed	  at	  “the	  furthering	  
of	  studies	  and	  free	  discussion	  from	  diverse	  standpoints	  in	  the	  field	  of	  philosophy	  of	  science”	  





science’s	  aim	  of	  practical	  benefits	  for	  all	  people	  had	  completely	  disappeared1	  (Douglas	  2012).	  	  
Around	  this	  time,	  philosophers	  of	  science	  also	  ceased	  to	  be	  regular	  participants	  at	  the	  annual	  
conference	  for	  the	  American	  Association	  for	  the	  Advancement	  of	  Science	  (AAAS)	  (Douglas	  
2009a).	  	  This	  withdrawal	  is	  telling.	  	  The	  AAAS	  is	  the	  world’s	  largest	  scientific	  society,	  and	  it	  
explicitly	  dedicates	  itself	  to	  serving	  society	  (as	  we	  discuss	  in	  greater	  detail	  below).	  	  This	  trend	  
toward	  the	  social	  disengagement	  of	  philosophy	  of	  science	  has	  continued	  more	  or	  less	  
uninterrupted	  until	  fairly	  recently.	  	  	  
The	  decreasing	  social	  engagement	  of	  philosophy	  of	  science	  is	  made	  more	  striking	  by	  an	  
opposed	  tendency	  in	  the	  sciences	  toward	  increased	  social	  engagement.	  Scientists	  today	  have	  a	  
plethora	  of	  organizations	  with	  the	  purpose	  of	  furthering	  science	  for	  the	  public	  good.	  	  Besides	  
AAAS,	  there	  is	  the	  Nobel	  Foundation	  Rights	  Association,	  the	  Union	  of	  Concerned	  Scientists,	  and	  
many	  others.	  	  Even	  at	  the	  stage	  of	  research	  design,	  major	  funding	  agencies	  increasingly	  require	  
scientists	  to	  consider	  how	  their	  work	  benefits	  society.	  In	  2014	  the	  Higher	  Education	  Funding	  
Council	  of	  England	  will	  begin	  using	  the	  Research	  Excellence	  Framework	  (REF),	  meant	  to	  ensure	  
that	  funded	  research	  has	  clear	  benefits	  to	  the	  public	  (REF.ac.uk).	  The	  European	  Commission’s	  
seventh	  Framework	  Programme,	  set	  to	  grant	  $65	  billion	  to	  EU	  researchers	  from	  2007-­‐2013,	  
judges	  all	  proposals	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  estimated	  societal	  impact	  (De	  Smedt	  2010).	  The	  National	  
Institutes	  of	  Health	  (NIH)	  selectively	  funds	  research	  that	  scores	  highly	  in	  terms	  of	  public	  
significance	  (grants.nih.gov).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Richard	  Rudner	  served	  as	  Editor-­‐in-­‐Chief	  of	  PSA	  from	  1959-­‐1974.	  In	  his	  resignation	  letter,	  Rudner	  suggests	  finding	  
a	  future	  editor	  that	  can	  continue	  certain	  “non-­‐doctrinaire”	  policies	  of	  focusing	  both	  on	  core	  issues	  in	  philosophy	  of	  
science	  (explanation,	  prediction,	  verification,	  theory	  formation	  and	  change)	  and	  special	  areas	  of	  philosophy	  of	  
science	  (philosophy	  of	  physics,	  philosophy	  of	  biology,	  philosophy	  of	  psychology,	  etc.).	  The	  absence	  of	  any	  socially	  
or	  politically	  relevant	  topics	  on	  this	  list	  is	  especially	  notable,	  given	  Rudner’s	  own	  active	  political	  involvement	  and	  





Perhaps	  the	  most	  illustrative	  example	  of	  science’s	  trend	  toward	  social	  engagement	  is	  
the	  National	  Science	  Foundation’s	  (NSF)	  major	  changes	  in	  1997	  to	  how	  research	  proposals	  
would	  be	  evaluated.	  Most	  notably,	  the	  “broader	  impacts”	  criterion	  was	  introduced	  as	  one	  of	  
two	  merit	  criteria	  used	  for	  funding	  decisions.	  The	  NSF	  Grant	  Proposal	  Guide	  states	  that	  the	  
criterion	  “encompasses	  the	  potential	  to	  benefit	  society	  and	  contribute	  to	  the	  achievement	  of	  
specific,	  desired	  societal	  outcomes”	  (NSF	  GPG	  p.58).	  	  NSF	  director	  Arden	  Bement	  claims	  that	  
“the	  criterion	  was	  established	  to	  get	  scientists	  out	  of	  their	  ivory	  towers	  and	  connect	  them	  to	  
society”	  (Lok	  2010,	  p.1).	  	  The	  broader	  impacts	  criterion	  encourages	  scientists	  to	  “contribute	  to	  
the	  achievement	  of	  societally	  relevant	  outcomes”	  such	  as	  “increased	  public	  scientific	  literacy	  
and	  public	  engagement	  with	  science	  and	  technology”	  and	  “improved	  well-­‐being	  of	  individuals	  
in	  society”	  (NSF	  GPG,	  p.25).	  	  
The	  AAAS’s	  history	  of	  social	  involvement	  provides	  another	  effective	  contrast	  with	  
philosophy	  of	  science’s	  withdrawal	  from	  social	  concerns.	  The	  organization	  represents	  ten	  
million	  members	  under	  the	  unifying	  mission	  to	  “advance	  science	  and	  serve	  society.”	  In	  the	  
1960s	  the	  AAAS	  began	  to	  place	  an	  explicit	  emphasis	  on	  	  
Bringing	  underrepresented	  groups	  into	  science;	  applying	  science	  to	  human	  rights;	  
supporting	  the	  growth	  of	  science	  in	  the	  developing	  world;	  exploring	  issues	  of	  science,	  
ethics,	  and	  law;	  tracking	  federal	  spending	  for	  R&D;	  and	  bringing	  scientists	  and	  engineers	  






The	  AAAS	  was	  becoming	  more	  socially	  engaged	  just	  as	  philosophy	  of	  science	  was	  beginning	  to	  
distance	  itself	  from	  social	  concerns.	  	  In	  1985	  AAAS	  initiated	  the	  ‘2061	  project’	  to	  improve	  
science	  literacy	  and	  extend	  the	  benefits	  of	  ‘scientific	  thinking’	  to	  the	  general	  public,	  resulting	  in	  
the	  book	  Science	  for	  All	  Americans,	  which	  is	  now	  a	  free	  online	  resource.	  	  The	  book	  includes	  the	  
treatment	  of	  topics	  in	  history	  and	  philosophy	  of	  science	  in	  straightforward	  language,	  including	  
scientific	  objectivity,	  the	  relation	  of	  theory	  to	  evidence	  and	  justification,	  the	  demarcation	  
between	  science	  and	  non-­‐science,	  explanation	  and	  prediction,	  and	  the	  social	  structure	  of	  
science	  (AAAS	  1990).	  The	  AAAS	  archives	  notes	  that	  these	  treatments	  are	  to	  be	  provided	  by	  
“expert	  panels	  of	  scientists,	  mathematicians,	  and	  technologists”	  [AAAS.org	  archives	  1971-­‐
present];	  the	  absence	  of	  philosophers	  of	  science	  from	  this	  list	  is	  telling.	  The	  resemblance	  
between	  the	  social	  justification	  of	  “Science	  for	  All	  Americans”	  and	  the	  Vienna	  Circle’s	  “Scientific	  
Conception	  of	  the	  World”	  is	  striking:	  	  
Scientific	  habits	  of	  mind	  can	  help	  people	  in	  every	  walk	  of	  life	  to	  deal	  sensibly	  
with	  problems	  that	  often	  involve	  evidence,	  quantitative	  considerations,	  logical	  
arguments,	  and	  uncertainty;	  without	  the	  ability	  to	  think	  critically	  and	  
independently,	  citizens	  are	  easy	  prey	  to	  dogmatists,	  flimflam	  artists,	  and	  
purveyors	  of	  simple	  solutions	  to	  complex	  problems	  (AAAS	  1990,	  p.	  xiv).	  	  
Neurath	  believed	  that	  philosophers	  of	  science	  could	  achieve	  these	  very	  same	  ends	  in	  much	  the	  
same	  fashion-­‐-­‐by	  extending	  the	  benefits	  of	  scientific	  rationality	  to	  citizens	  of	  democratic	  
societies	  (Reisch	  1994,	  p.	  164).	  Even	  as	  this	  attitude	  has	  faded	  from	  philosophy	  of	  science,	  it	  has	  





There	  is,	  though,	  some	  hope	  of	  a	  turnaround	  in	  philosophy	  of	  science’s	  social	  
disengagement,	  as	  a	  number	  of	  recent	  initiatives	  break	  from	  this	  pattern.	  	  Recent	  events	  and	  
publications	  that	  have	  focused	  on	  philosophy	  of	  science	  and	  social	  issues	  include,	  for	  example,	  
an	  American	  Philosophical	  Association	  (APA)	  mini-­‐conference	  in	  2008	  on	  the	  topic	  of	  “Making	  
Philosophy	  of	  Science	  More	  Socially	  Relevant”;	  a	  special	  issue	  in	  Synthese	  in	  2010	  on	  “Socially	  
Relevant	  Philosophy	  of	  Science”2;	  and	  a	  conference	  on	  “advancing	  public	  philosophy”	  held	  in	  
Washington	  D.C.	  in	  2011,	  hosted	  by	  the	  newly-­‐formed	  Public	  Philosophy	  Network	  (PPN).	  In	  
addition,	  the	  Society	  for	  Philosophy	  of	  Science	  in	  Practice	  (SPSP)	  launched	  at	  PSA	  2006	  with	  the	  
aim	  of	  “a	  philosophy	  of	  science	  that	  engages	  more	  closely	  with	  scientific	  practice,	  and	  with	  the	  
practical	  uses	  of	  scientific	  knowledge”	  (SPSP	  meeting	  invitation).	  	  The	  newly	  formed	  Consortium	  
for	  Socially	  Relevant	  Philosophy	  of/in	  Science	  and	  Engineering	  (SRPo/iSE)	  “organizes	  and	  
promotes	  practitioners	  and	  institutions	  that	  use	  work	  at	  the	  intersection	  of	  philosophy	  and	  
science/	  technology	  to	  positively	  impact	  society”	  (srpoise.psu.edu).3	  Finally,	  the	  Joint	  Caucus	  for	  
Socially	  Engaged	  Philosophy	  and	  History	  of	  Science	  (JCSEPHS),	  newly	  formed	  under	  the	  aegis	  of	  
the	  Philosophy	  of	  Science	  Association	  and	  the	  History	  of	  Science	  Society,	  was	  established	  at	  
HSS/PSA	  2012.	  The	  creation	  of	  JCSEPHS	  was	  catalyzed	  by	  the	  participants	  of	  University	  of	  
Cincinnati’s	  49th	  annual	  philosophy	  colloquium,	  an	  event	  that	  demonstrated	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  
vibrant	  community	  of	  philosophers	  interested	  in	  a	  more	  “Socially	  Engaged	  Philosophy	  of	  
Science,”	  the	  theme	  of	  the	  conference	  and	  of	  this	  ensuing	  collection	  of	  papers.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  This	  special	  issue	  arose	  from	  an	  eponymous	  mini-­‐conference	  at	  a	  2010	  APA	  meeting.	  	  
3	  SRPo/iSE	  is	  supported	  by	  philosophers	  at	  several	  academic	  institutions,	  including	  Kevin	  Elliott	  and	  Heather	  





2	  Philosophy	  of	  Science’s	  Social	  Obligations	  
In	  this	  section	  we	  address	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  philosophers	  of	  science	  have	  a	  responsibility	  
to	  engage	  with	  society	  in	  navigating	  scientific	  issues	  and	  conflicts.	  	  In	  her	  article	  in	  this	  issue,	  
Heather	  Douglas	  develops	  a	  position	  regarding	  the	  moral	  obligations	  of	  scientists	  that	  provides	  
an	  instructive	  parallel.	  Douglas	  draws	  on	  the	  notion	  of	  “role	  responsibility”	  to	  explore	  the	  moral	  
demands	  placed	  upon	  scientists	  within	  democratic	  societies.	  A	  role	  responsibility	  is	  incurred	  
when	  one	  accepts	  a	  role	  that	  accords	  understanding	  and	  abilities	  that,	  given	  one’s	  social	  
context,	  establishes	  a	  particular	  societal	  value.	  What	  responsibility	  is	  incurred	  depends	  on	  the	  
value	  produced	  by	  the	  particular	  understanding	  and	  abilities	  associated	  with	  the	  role.	  In	  the	  
case	  of	  science,	  Douglas	  claims	  that	  science’s	  special	  value	  to	  society	  is	  its	  capability	  of	  
producing	  “robust,	  reliable,	  empirical	  knowledge”	  (p.4).	  Practitioners	  of	  science	  have	  a	  special	  
role	  responsibility,	  then,	  to	  adopt	  practices	  internal	  to	  science	  that	  protect	  and	  facilitate	  their	  
ability	  to	  produce	  robust,	  reliable,	  empirical	  knowledge.	  Because	  the	  responsibility	  to	  ensure	  
that	  science	  produces	  robust,	  reliable,	  empirical	  knowledge	  is	  often	  too	  onerous	  for	  any	  
particular	  individual	  scientist	  to	  completely	  satisfy	  on	  their	  own,	  scientific	  communities	  incur	  a	  
collective	  responsibility	  to	  provide	  and	  maintain	  institutional	  structures	  that	  fulfill	  scientists’	  
role	  responsibility	  to	  society.	  	  
Douglas	  argues	  that	  there	  are	  three	  “bases”	  of	  the	  individual	  and	  collective	  role	  
responsibilities	  of	  science,	  each	  affecting	  to	  what	  extent	  science	  produces	  its	  value	  to	  society:	  
good	  scientific	  reasoning,	  a	  collaborative	  and	  cross-­‐critical	  scientific	  community,	  and	  a	  





scientific	  values	  and	  methods,	  and	  through	  participation	  in	  collaborative	  scientific	  institutions,	  
possess	  the	  understanding	  to	  satisfy	  the	  first	  two	  bases	  of	  their	  responsibility.	  But	  we	  question	  
whether	  they	  are	  particularly	  well	  qualified	  to	  satisfy	  the	  third,	  which	  requires	  one	  to	  consider	  
how	  science	  relates	  to	  the	  many	  competing	  values	  in	  democratic	  societies.	  	  	  
In	  the	  autumn	  of	  1955,	  Richard	  Feynman	  gave	  a	  public	  address	  to	  the	  National	  Academy	  
of	  Sciences	  in	  which	  he	  discussed	  the	  unique	  value	  of	  science	  to	  society.	  Feynman’s	  work	  on	  the	  
atomic	  bomb	  had,	  in	  part,	  made	  possible	  the	  killing	  of	  many	  thousands	  of	  people	  in	  Hiroshima	  
and	  Nagasaki.	  With	  this	  in	  mind,	  he	  observed	  that	  “scientific	  knowledge	  is	  an	  enabling	  power	  to	  
do	  either	  good	  or	  bad—but	  it	  does	  not	  carry	  instructions	  on	  how	  to	  use	  it”	  (p.1).	  The	  most	  
prominent	  value	  of	  science	  to	  society,	  that	  it	  “enables	  us	  to	  do	  all	  kinds	  of	  things	  and	  to	  make	  
all	  kinds	  of	  things”	  (p.1),	  is	  also	  its	  most	  prominent	  danger	  to	  society.	  Feynman	  illustrates	  this	  
point	  further	  by	  alluding	  to	  a	  Buddhist	  parable,	  “To	  every	  man	  is	  given	  the	  key	  to	  the	  gates	  of	  
heaven;	  the	  same	  key	  opens	  the	  gates	  of	  hell.”	  This	  works	  as	  an	  analogy	  for	  science.	  Scientists,	  
Feynman	  claims,	  are	  naïve	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  questions	  of	  how	  science	  should	  operate	  and	  
be	  disseminated	  in	  society,	  as	  well	  as	  how	  to	  pursue	  research	  with	  beneficial	  effects.	  Scientists	  
are	  uniquely	  qualified	  to	  use	  empirical	  methods	  to	  learn	  about	  the	  world	  and	  to	  enable	  us	  to	  do	  
and	  make	  all	  kinds	  of	  things.	  Yet,	  regarding	  the	  third	  base	  of	  science’s	  responsibility	  that	  
Douglas	  identifies,	  in	  Feynman’s	  view	  a	  scientist	  is	  “just	  as	  dumb	  as	  the	  next	  guy…as	  naïve	  as	  
anyone	  untrained	  in	  the	  matter”	  (Feynman,	  p.13).	  According	  to	  Douglas,	  the	  question	  of	  how	  
scientific	  and	  social	  values	  should	  relate,	  interact,	  and	  integrate	  is	  “potent	  and	  central”	  (p.6).	  
She	  is	  not	  alone	  in	  this	  view;	  Kitcher	  expresses	  the	  hope	  that	  “we	  achieve	  the	  needed	  





social	  values	  should	  not	  be	  shouldered	  by	  scientists	  alone,	  as	  they	  are	  not	  particularly	  qualified	  
for	  this	  task.	  	  
In	  contrast,	  the	  training	  of	  philosophers	  of	  science	  is	  particularly	  useful	  in	  this	  
connection.	  Philosophy	  of	  science	  offers	  a	  rich	  field	  of	  perspectives	  wide	  enough	  to	  capture	  the	  
complexity	  of	  relations	  between	  science	  and	  society	  and	  critical	  enough	  to	  assess	  the	  
underlying	  assumptions,	  interests,	  and	  histories	  of	  socio-­‐scientific	  conflicts—and	  even	  to	  help	  
resolve	  such	  conflicts.	  The	  skillset	  of	  philosophers	  of	  science,	  collectively,	  includes	  a	  special	  
‘toolkit’	  of	  method	  and	  understanding.	  Methodologically,	  philosophers	  of	  science	  are	  trained	  in	  
the	  use	  of	  critical	  analysis,	  skepticism,	  and	  dialogue	  as	  a	  means	  to	  generate	  understanding.	  This	  
technique	  is	  extremely	  flexible,	  allowing	  philosophers	  to	  engage	  productively	  with	  a	  wide	  
variety	  of	  topics.	  Philosophers	  of	  science	  are	  also	  equipped	  with	  knowledge	  of	  individual	  
scientific	  subfields.	  Combined	  with	  training	  in	  dialogue	  and	  argument,	  this	  should	  prepare	  
philosophers	  to	  act	  as	  mediators,	  educators,	  and	  advocates.	  These	  roles	  emphasize	  dialogue,	  
critical	  treatment	  of	  multi-­‐faceted	  arguments,	  and	  sensitivity	  to	  the	  values	  and	  interests	  of	  
different	  perspectives.	  Perhaps	  most	  importantly,	  philosophy	  enables	  distance	  from	  the	  
particular	  interests	  of	  stakeholders	  in	  debates.	  This	  impartiality	  allows	  for	  “a	  moderate	  view,	  
one	  of	  advocating	  for	  reasons	  and	  rationalism	  rather	  than	  a	  particular	  political	  result”	  
(Maienschein,	  this	  volume,	  p.	  24).	  	  
All	  of	  this	  grounds,	  in	  our	  view,	  a	  role	  responsibility	  of	  philosophy	  of	  science	  to	  help	  
mediate	  science’s	  social	  position.	  Similar	  to	  what	  Douglas	  argues	  is	  the	  case	  in	  science,	  the	  role	  





responsibility.	  One	  reason	  for	  this	  is	  that	  mediating	  the	  relationship	  between	  science	  and	  
society	  is	  too	  onerous	  to	  be	  shouldered	  by	  individual	  philosophers	  of	  science.	  Additionally,	  it	  
seems	  no	  individual	  philosopher	  of	  science	  has	  the	  obligation	  to	  pursue	  research	  with	  social	  
relevance	  to	  the	  exclusion	  of	  her	  other	  interests.	  	  Instead,	  the	  responsibility	  of	  individual	  
philosophers	  of	  science	  can	  be	  satisfied	  by	  supporting	  the	  creation	  and	  maintenance	  of	  
institutional	  structures	  that	  help	  philosophy	  of	  science	  fulfill	  its	  collective	  responsibility.4	  
Many	  of	  the	  core	  topics	  in	  philosophy	  of	  science	  bear	  directly	  on	  a	  range	  of	  socio-­‐
scientific	  conflicts,	  despite	  philosophers	  of	  science	  often	  distancing	  their	  work	  from	  these	  
issues.	  For	  example,	  philosophical	  work	  on	  scientific	  practice	  can	  help	  reveal	  instances	  when	  
arguments	  used	  to	  create	  public	  distrust	  of	  some	  scientific	  finding	  appeal	  to	  problematic	  
scientific	  practices.	  The	  misrepresentation	  of	  responsible	  science	  and	  the	  application	  of	  bad	  
scientific	  practices	  have	  been	  used	  to	  undermine	  scientific	  consensus	  on	  the	  causes	  of	  HIV/AIDS	  
(Markoba	  2002),	  the	  danger	  of	  genetically	  modified	  foods	  (Smith	  2003),	  and	  the	  causes	  and	  
severity	  of	  climate	  change	  (Dunlap	  et.	  al	  2011).	  The	  related	  problem	  of	  demarcating	  science	  
from	  non-­‐science	  is	  controversial	  in	  philosophy	  of	  science	  and	  has	  received	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  
attention.	  This	  was	  the	  central	  question	  in	  Tammy	  Kitzmiller,	  et	  al.	  v.	  Dover	  Area	  School	  District,	  
et	  al.	  (400	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  707,	  Docket	  no.	  4cv2688)—the	  case	  that	  decided	  whether	  Intelligent	  
Design	  could	  be	  taught	  in	  public	  schools.	  Philosophy	  of	  science	  might	  also	  contribute	  to	  public	  
understanding	  of	  scientific	  uncertainty.	  	  Historians	  of	  science	  Naomi	  Oreskes	  and	  Erik	  Conway	  
(2010)	  argue	  that	  the	  public	  tends	  to	  view	  science	  as	  something	  that	  provides	  certainty,	  “an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Douglas	  distinguishes	  between	  role	  responsibilities	  and	  general	  responsibilities.	  Philosophers	  of	  science	  qua	  
human	  beings	  may	  have	  a	  general	  responsibility	  to	  work	  to	  make	  the	  world	  a	  better	  place	  in	  one	  way	  or	  another,	  
but	  we	  focus	  on	  role	  responsibilities,	  viz.,	  whether	  philosophers	  of	  science	  have	  special	  responsibilities	  toward	  





erroneous	  view	  of	  science”	  that	  allows	  powerful	  groups	  or	  individuals	  to	  undermine	  actions	  to	  
address	  important	  social	  problems.	  Policy-­‐makers	  similarly	  often	  fail	  to	  understand	  that	  
uncertainty	  is	  a	  feature	  of	  all	  science,	  and	  this	  failure	  of	  understanding	  can	  have	  severe	  
consequences.	  Sandra	  Mitchell	  argues	  that	  U.S.	  policy-­‐makers	  depend	  on	  traditional	  cost-­‐
benefit	  and	  ‘predict	  and	  act’	  models,	  and	  that	  this	  dependence	  “can	  lead	  to	  ignoring	  the	  
scientific	  knowledge	  we	  do	  have	  and	  prevent	  our	  policies	  from	  being	  informed	  by	  that	  science”	  
(2009,	  p.4).	  Philosophers	  of	  science	  have	  endorsed	  decision-­‐making	  models	  that	  accommodate	  
scientific	  uncertainty	  (Popper	  et	  al,	  2005,	  Mitchell	  2009,	  Morgan	  and	  Henrion	  1990).	  	  
Philosophers	  of	  science	  might	  also	  contribute	  to	  an	  improved	  public	  understanding	  of	  
the	  diversity	  and	  variation	  of	  scientific	  methodology	  (Dupré	  1990,	  Wylie	  2000,	  Mitchell	  2009).	  
Many	  philosophers	  of	  science	  have	  cultivated	  an	  expertise	  on	  the	  methodological	  features	  of	  
particular	  fields.	  For	  instance,	  Wendy	  Parker	  is	  expert	  in	  the	  peculiarities	  of	  climate	  science	  and	  
is	  thus	  able	  to	  explain	  why	  methodological	  standards	  present	  in	  other	  areas	  of	  science,	  such	  as	  
consistency	  and	  truth-­‐preservation,	  are	  not	  appropriate	  in	  climate	  modeling	  (Parker	  2006,	  
2010).	  In	  another	  case,	  Kevin	  Elliott	  applied	  his	  specialist	  knowledge	  of	  the	  hormesis	  
phenomenon	  in	  environmental	  toxicology	  to	  discuss	  which	  particular	  societal	  values	  can	  be	  
incorporated	  into	  assessments	  of	  public	  policy	  when	  human	  health	  is	  at	  stake,	  and	  how	  this	  can	  
be	  done	  (Elliott	  2011).	  	  	  
Perhaps	  most	  significantly,	  philosophers	  of	  science	  have	  developed	  an	  understanding	  of	  
science	  as	  “a	  socially	  established	  and	  co-­‐operative	  activity”	  (Gower	  1997,	  p.	  243).	  This	  has	  led	  





conception	  that	  is	  held	  by	  a	  majority	  of	  scientists,	  policy-­‐makers,	  journalists,	  and	  the	  general	  
public	  (Kitcher	  2001).	  Douglas	  (2009b)	  identifies	  the	  need	  for	  scientists	  and	  policy-­‐makers	  to	  
make	  explicit	  the	  values	  that	  influence	  research	  design	  and	  execution,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  
communication	  of	  results.	  But,	  as	  discussed	  above,	  scientists	  are	  not	  typically	  trained	  to	  identify	  
the	  values	  at	  play	  in	  their	  research.	  Philosophers	  of	  science,	  in	  contrast,	  are	  well	  positioned	  for	  
this	  by	  their	  “distinct	  role”—the	  nature	  of	  their	  professional	  activity	  and	  understanding	  (cf.	  
Douglas,	  this	  issue).	  	  
Philosophers	  of	  science	  can	  do	  more	  than	  merely	  recognize	  values	  at	  play	  in	  science	  and	  
society;	  they	  are	  also	  well-­‐positioned	  to	  help	  improve	  how	  values	  are	  employed	  and	  to	  navigate	  
socio-­‐scientific	  conflicts.	  	  Feminist	  philosophy	  of	  science,	  in	  addition	  to	  identifying	  conceptions	  
and	  practices	  that	  can	  subordinate	  gender	  and	  minority	  groups,	  “strives	  to	  reform	  these	  
conceptions	  and	  practices”	  (Anderson	  2012).	  	  One	  might	  argue	  that,	  because	  feminist	  
philosophers	  of	  science	  have	  developed	  a	  special	  expertise	  in	  identifying	  practices	  that	  
negatively	  impact	  subordinated	  groups,	  the	  field	  has	  incurred	  a	  collective	  role	  responsibility	  to	  
contribute	  to	  the	  reform	  of	  those	  practices.	  Similarly,	  philosophy	  of	  science	  as	  a	  field	  has	  a	  
collective	  responsibility	  to	  employ	  special	  expertise	  where	  it	  can	  contribute	  to	  human	  welfare.	  
This	  responsibility	  arises	  because	  philosophers	  of	  science	  have	  cultivated	  a	  set	  of	  skills	  with	  
special	  relevance	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  social	  issues.	  Failure	  to	  fulfill	  this	  collective	  responsibility	  
constitutes	  a	  failure	  to	  improve	  public	  welfare	  in	  a	  way	  that	  would	  have	  been	  special	  to	  
philosophy	  of	  science.	  We	  have	  surveyed	  a	  range	  of	  issues	  important	  to	  public	  welfare,	  aspects	  
of	  which	  are	  particularly	  amenable	  to	  treatment	  by	  philosophers	  of	  science.	  These	  include	  





religion),	  research	  credibility	  (biased	  industry-­‐funded	  research),	  public	  trust	  of	  science	  
(ideology-­‐based	  abuses	  of	  science),	  and	  even	  the	  long-­‐term	  survival	  of	  our	  species	  (industrial	  
and	  political	  attacks	  on	  climate	  science).	  Accordingly,	  in	  our	  view,	  philosophy	  of	  science	  has	  a	  
collective	  responsibility	  to	  engage	  more	  directly	  and	  substantively	  with	  socio-­‐scientific	  issues,	  
with	  the	  aim	  of	  improving	  human	  welfare.	  	  
	  
3	  Socially	  Engaged	  Philosophy	  of	  Science	  
In	  this	  section	  we	  address	  the	  issue	  of	  what	  form	  a	  more	  socially	  involved	  philosophy	  of	  science	  
should	  take.	  	  We	  articulate	  a	  program	  of	  research,	  education,	  and	  advocacy,	  undertaken	  by	  
philosophers	  of	  science	  qua	  philosophers	  of	  science,	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  improving	  human	  welfare,	  
which	  we	  dub	  “socially	  engaged	  philosophy	  of	  science’’	  (SEPOS).	  Socially	  engaged	  philosophers	  
of	  science	  identify	  issues	  arising	  from	  conflict	  or	  misunderstanding	  between	  scientific	  
communities	  and	  citizens	  and	  apply	  the	  tools	  of	  philosophy	  of	  science	  to	  those	  issues.	  SEPOS	  is	  
thus	  an	  extension	  of	  philosophy	  of	  science	  that	  leverages	  the	  distinctive	  expertise	  of	  the	  field	  as	  
a	  public	  resource.	  This	  discussion	  is	  meant	  both	  to	  motivate	  a	  more	  socially	  engaged	  philosophy	  
of	  science	  and	  to	  characterize	  the	  diverse	  set	  of	  projects	  by	  philosophers	  that	  are	  aimed	  at	  
contributing	  to	  the	  public	  good.	  	  
For	  many	  reasons,	  contemporary	  philosophy	  of	  science	  lacks	  a	  dominant,	  socially	  
conscious	  mission	  statement	  like	  the	  Vienna	  Circle’s	  “Scientific	  Conception	  of	  the	  World.”	  
SEPOS,	  in	  turn,	  reflects	  the	  diversity	  of	  methods,	  goals,	  and	  values	  in	  different	  areas	  of	  science	  





Three-­‐quarters	  of	  a	  century’s	  work	  has	  shown	  that	  different	  areas	  of	  Science	  are	  
methodologically	  diverse,	  and	  that	  most	  of	  the	  interesting	  challenges	  and	  disputes	  
within	  those	  areas	  resist	  the	  styles	  of	  formalization	  philosophers	  have	  wanted	  to	  
impose”	  (2011,	  p.154).	  	  
Treating	  issues	  locally	  means	  attending	  to	  the	  distinctive	  scientific	  and	  social	  features	  of	  an	  
issue.	  For	  example,	  the	  most	  successful	  climate	  modeling	  approaches	  incorporate	  several	  
computational	  models	  that	  rely	  on	  assumptions	  that	  contradict	  one	  another	  (Parker	  2006).	  
These	  models	  thus	  cannot	  be	  strictly	  true	  of	  the	  world,	  and	  this	  might	  be	  used	  to	  undermine	  
their	  credibility	  and	  to	  discourage	  their	  use	  in	  public-­‐policy	  discussions.	  But	  such	  an	  attack	  on	  
climate	  models	  can	  be	  diffused	  by	  revealing	  the	  distinctive	  methods	  and	  standards	  of	  
justification	  at	  play	  and	  by	  addressing	  directly	  the	  issue	  of	  whether	  public	  officials—given	  their	  
values	  and	  the	  values	  of	  the	  public	  they	  represent—should	  use	  the	  models	  to	  inform	  public	  
policy.	  In	  contrast,	  it	  would	  be	  unhelpful	  to	  present	  public	  officials	  with	  a	  highly	  generalized	  
account	  of	  scientific	  justification	  or	  to	  insist	  that	  public	  interest	  is	  not	  relevant	  to	  determining	  
what	  methods	  are	  used.	  	  SEPOS	  has	  a	  local	  focus	  because	  methods	  and	  standards	  differ	  within	  
science	  and	  because	  socio-­‐scientific	  issues	  affect	  various	  communities	  of	  scientists	  and	  citizens	  
differently.	  	  Viewing	  “science”	  and	  “the	  public”	  as	  homogenous	  is	  a	  mistaken	  oversimplification.	  	  	  
Despite	  its	  localized	  nature,	  SEPOS	  research,	  projects,	  and	  activities	  involve	  three	  
general	  desiderata:	  public	  motive,	  specificity,	  and	  accessibility.	  These	  desiderata	  are	  not	  rigid	  
requirements,	  but	  they	  help	  distinguish	  SEPOS	  from	  other	  projects	  in	  philosophy	  of	  science,	  





SEPOS	  has	  a	  public	  motive,	  for	  its	  principle	  motivation	  is	  to	  leverage	  the	  skillsets	  of	  philosophers	  
of	  science	  to	  improve	  human	  welfare.	  In	  her	  contribution	  to	  this	  issue,	  Janet	  Kourany	  identifies	  
the	  debate	  over	  the	  future	  of	  human	  enhancement	  as	  the	  most	  serious	  facing	  science	  and	  
society	  in	  the	  21st	  century.	  Kourany	  worries	  that,	  without	  the	  participation	  of	  philosophers	  of	  
science,	  the	  debate	  will	  stagnate,	  thereby	  negatively	  impacting	  human	  welfare.	  This	  is	  the	  
expression	  of	  a	  public	  motive.	  Pursuant	  to	  our	  argument	  in	  Section	  2,	  the	  improvement	  of	  
human	  welfare	  should	  not	  be	  simply	  a	  secondary	  consequence	  of	  philosophical	  work	  with	  other	  
aims,	  but	  is	  an	  important	  end	  goal	  of	  philosophy	  of	  science	  taken	  as	  a	  public	  resource.	  This	  
public	  motive	  does	  not	  preclude	  SEPOS’s	  contribution	  to	  technical	  discussions	  within	  
philosophy	  of	  science.	  	  As	  demonstrated	  by	  Margaret	  Morrison’s	  article	  in	  this	  issue,	  progress	  
on	  traditional	  topics	  in	  philosophy	  of	  science,	  such	  as	  explanation	  and	  evidence,	  are	  a	  likely	  
consequence	  of	  SEPOS,	  even	  with	  its	  focus	  on	  public	  welfare.	  	  
This	  public	  motive,	  along	  with	  SEPOS’s	  local	  nature,	  in	  turn	  inspires	  the	  other	  two	  
characteristic	  features	  of	  socially	  engaged	  philosophy	  of	  science.	  SEPOS	  most	  effectively	  
pursues	  its	  public	  motive	  when	  it	  is	  specific	  to	  a	  particular	  socio-­‐scientific	  issue	  and	  to	  the	  
groups,	  individuals,	  or	  institutions	  with	  a	  stake	  in	  that	  issue.	  Specifying	  particular	  stakeholders	  
and	  particular	  aspects	  of	  scientific	  issues	  of	  public	  concern	  ensures	  engagement	  with	  
stakeholders’	  actual	  interests.	  For	  example,	  in	  his	  contribution	  to	  this	  issue,	  Kevin	  Elliott	  does	  
not	  try	  to	  address	  the	  problem	  of	  scientific	  credibility	  in	  general.	  Rather,	  he	  focuses	  on	  
particular	  stakeholders	  with	  particular	  values	  and	  interests—those	  who	  want	  to	  lessen	  the	  
effects	  of	  biased	  research	  by	  creating	  criteria	  designed	  to	  recognize	  likely	  instances	  of	  





issue,	  viz.,	  its	  style	  and	  venue	  must	  be	  appropriate	  for	  the	  particular	  stakeholders	  and	  the	  
particular	  issue.	  Work	  is	  published	  in	  ways	  that	  reach	  relevant	  communities	  and	  is	  presented	  in	  
terms	  that	  they	  will	  engage	  with.	  Because	  SEPOS	  is	  localized,	  the	  appropriate	  presentation	  style	  
and	  venue	  will	  vary.	  	  
Taken	  together,	  these	  three	  desiderata	  capture	  what	  is	  distinctive	  about	  socially	  
engaged	  philosophy	  of	  science.	  	  An	  example	  of	  how	  effective	  SEPOS	  satisfies	  these	  desiderata	  is	  
Kristen	  Schrader-­‐Freschette’s	  work	  in	  the	  early	  1990s	  to	  ameliorate	  conflicts	  between	  public,	  
scientific,	  and	  political	  interests	  surrounding	  the	  storage	  of	  nuclear	  waste.	  	  This	  work	  was	  
specific	  to	  a	  particular	  socio-­‐scientific	  problem	  at	  the	  height	  of	  its	  societal	  relevance,	  motivated	  
by	  concern	  for	  public	  welfare,	  and	  delivered	  in	  a	  way	  that	  was	  accessible	  to	  different	  
stakeholders	  in	  the	  waste-­‐storage	  dispute	  (Schrader-­‐Freschette,	  1993).	  The	  papers	  comprising	  
this	  issue	  also	  exemplify	  the	  characteristics	  of	  SEPOS;	  here	  we	  address	  each	  in	  turn.	  	  
In	  his	  contribution,	  Kevin	  Elliott	  addresses	  the	  social	  problem	  of	  industry	  and	  
government	  agencies	  engaging	  in	  misleading	  research	  designed	  to	  confuse	  the	  public	  on	  a	  
range	  of	  important	  issues.	  The	  work’s	  principal	  concern	  is	  thus	  public	  welfare.	  Elliott	  targets	  the	  
issue	  of	  research	  credibility	  in	  part	  because	  it	  is	  a	  topic	  in	  philosophy	  of	  science’s	  wheelhouse.	  
He	  points	  out	  that	  credibility	  is	  really	  just	  a	  question	  about	  how	  evidence	  bears	  on	  some	  
claim—a	  relation	  that	  has	  been	  exhaustively	  explored	  by	  philosophers	  of	  science.	  The	  issue	  is	  
an	  immediate	  social	  problem,	  and	  one	  of	  increasing	  importance.	  Industry-­‐funded	  research	  
increasingly	  targets	  unfavorable	  independent	  results	  from	  other	  researchers,	  resulting	  in	  public	  





forward;	  he	  recommends	  a	  reasonable	  criterion	  for	  determining	  the	  credibility	  of	  studies.	  
Importantly,	  his	  recommendation	  is	  specific	  and	  accessible	  to	  those	  involved	  in	  the	  issue.	  	  	  	  
In	  her	  contribution,	  Margaret	  Morrison	  argues	  that	  we	  need	  to	  distinguish	  between	  
subjective	  features	  in	  computational	  modeling,	  and	  what	  we	  call	  “value	  judgments.”	  To	  fail	  to	  
distinguish	  the	  two	  is	  to	  fail	  to	  isolate	  the	  potentially	  harmful	  influence	  of	  pernicious	  value	  
judgments	  from	  other	  subjective	  influences	  that	  are	  known	  and	  accounted	  for.	  Morrison	  
identifies	  NASA’s	  Columbia	  disaster	  as	  one	  in	  which	  subjective	  features	  and	  value	  judgments	  
should	  be	  distinguished.	  Engineers	  evaluated	  the	  risk	  of	  foam	  damage	  to	  the	  Space	  Shuttle	  with	  
a	  computational	  risk	  assessment	  program	  designed	  to	  account	  for	  small	  debris	  (a	  subjective	  
feature),	  but	  NASA	  chose	  to	  apply	  the	  program	  outside	  its	  domain	  of	  application	  for	  reasons	  of	  
cost	  and	  ease	  of	  use	  (a	  value	  judgment).	  It	  was	  the	  value	  judgment	  that	  primarily	  contributed	  to	  
the	  destruction	  of	  Columbia,	  rather	  than	  the	  subjective	  features	  of	  the	  risk-­‐assessment	  
program.	  Morrison’s	  project	  is	  thus	  motivated	  to	  contribute	  to	  human	  welfare	  by	  providing	  a	  
means	  for	  distinguishing	  more	  harmful	  value	  judgments	  from	  subjective	  influences	  in	  science.	  
More,	  the	  project	  is	  specified	  to	  a	  particular	  context,	  computational	  risk-­‐assessment,	  in	  a	  way	  
that	  is	  sensitive	  to	  the	  local	  features	  of	  that	  current	  socio-­‐scientific	  problem.	  	  	  	  
Heather	  Douglas	  employs	  philosophical	  tools	  to	  identify	  the	  value	  commitments	  of	  
scientists	  and	  to	  situate	  them	  in	  a	  moral	  structure	  governing	  participation	  in	  science.	  	  She	  
recognizes	  that	  prior	  attempts	  to	  articulate	  the	  responsibilities	  of	  scientists	  have	  been	  either	  
too	  restrictive	  or	  too	  simplistic,	  and	  that	  articulating	  an	  appropriate	  set	  of	  moral	  responsibilities	  





articulate	  the	  moral	  terrain	  of	  science	  in	  part	  on	  the	  absence	  of	  contributions	  from	  
philosophers	  of	  science.	  Douglas	  puts	  her	  account	  to	  work	  on	  a	  case	  study	  of	  the	  controversial	  
publication	  of	  potentially	  dangerous	  H1N1	  research	  findings,	  in	  which	  public	  and	  scientific	  
values	  conflict.	  
In	  her	  contribution,	  Janet	  Kourany	  asks	  whether	  philosophers	  of	  science	  might	  help	  to	  
make	  the	  debate	  surrounding	  human	  enhancement	  (pharmaceutical,	  biological,	  nano-­‐
technological,	  etc.)	  a	  more	  productive	  one.	  The	  human	  enhancement	  issue	  is	  of	  immediate	  
social	  import,	  not	  least	  because	  the	  benefits	  of	  enhancement	  science	  are	  likely	  to	  
disproportionally	  favor	  the	  wealthy.	  Kourany	  suggests	  specific	  areas	  of	  the	  debate	  to	  which	  
philosophers	  of	  science	  can	  contribute,	  such	  as	  in	  specifying	  a	  framework	  of	  values	  among	  the	  
debate’s	  stakeholders.	  By	  making	  explicit	  the	  local	  values	  of	  scientists,	  policy-­‐makers,	  and	  
public	  constituencies,	  philosophers	  of	  science	  can	  allow	  the	  debate	  to	  proceed	  more	  rationally	  
and	  productively.	  Kourany’s	  article	  illustrates	  one	  way	  in	  which	  SEPOS	  can	  help	  address	  
Feynman’s	  worry	  that	  scientists	  are	  naïve	  regarding	  how	  science	  can	  best	  serve	  society’s	  
interests.	  	  
Crucial	  to	  our	  articulation	  of	  SEPOS,	  and	  in	  particular	  the	  desideratum	  of	  a	  public	  
motive,	  is	  the	  incorporation	  of	  activities	  beyond	  philosophical	  research,	  including	  advocacy	  and	  
education.	  In	  her	  article,	  Jane	  Maienschein	  discusses	  the	  role	  of	  the	  philosopher	  of	  science	  as	  a	  
direct	  participant	  in	  the	  relationship	  between	  science	  and	  society.	  She	  notes	  that,	  despite	  an	  
increasing	  tendency	  of	  philosophers	  of	  science	  to	  stress	  the	  social	  context	  of	  science,	  many	  still	  





social	  context	  must	  be	  an	  element	  of	  SEPOS,	  the	  current	  state	  of	  that	  understanding	  is	  often	  
sufficiently	  developed	  to	  support	  attempts	  to	  participate	  “on	  the	  ground	  level”	  of	  socio-­‐
scientific	  issues.	  Maienschein’s	  prior	  work	  as	  Science	  Advisor	  to	  Congressman	  Matt	  Salmon	  
illustrates	  a	  form	  of	  direct	  social	  engagement.	  Maienschein	  stresses	  that	  social	  engagement	  
requires	  philosophers	  to	  be	  ready	  to	  react	  to	  socially	  significant	  developments	  as	  they	  occur.	  
This	  results	  in	  part	  from	  attending	  to	  debates	  that	  are	  of	  current	  importance	  to	  the	  public,	  even	  
if	  they	  are	  not	  philosophically	  nuanced	  enough	  to	  be	  of	  intrinsic	  interest	  in	  philosophy	  of	  
science.	  	  
	  
4	  Moving	  Forward	  
In	  the	  introduction	  to	  a	  2010	  special	  issue	  of	  Synthese,	  “Socially	  Relevant	  Philosophy	  of	  
Science,”	  Carla	  Fehr	  and	  Kathryn	  Plaisance	  maintain	  that	  socially	  relevant	  philosophy	  of	  science	  
should	  be	  encouraged,	  both	  for	  its	  contributions	  to	  traditional	  philosophical	  problems	  and	  its	  
potential	  benefits	  for	  science	  and	  society.	  They	  argue	  for	  an	  expansion	  of	  socially	  relevant	  
philosophy	  of	  science,	  and	  they	  situate	  such	  projects	  within	  general	  philosophy	  of	  science.	  We	  
endorse	  this	  effort	  to	  make	  socially	  relevant	  work	  more	  central	  to	  philosophy	  of	  science.	  
Indeed,	  one	  of	  the	  most	  significant	  impediments	  to	  SEPOS	  is	  the	  view	  that	  issues	  of	  social	  
relevance	  are	  somehow	  outside	  the	  core	  issues	  in	  philosophy	  of	  science.	  That	  said,	  we	  also	  see	  
a	  pressing	  need	  for	  more	  philosophers	  of	  science	  to	  move	  beyond	  producing	  socially	  relevant	  
work,	  to	  actually	  effecting	  social	  change	  with	  their	  work.	  Socially	  engaged	  philosophy	  of	  science	  





and	  primary	  rather	  than	  incidental	  and	  secondary	  (see	  Section	  3).	  Here	  we	  survey	  the	  current	  
state	  of	  SEPOS,	  and	  we	  suggest	  some	  additional	  steps	  that	  philosophers	  of	  science	  can	  take	  to	  
support	  SEPOS,	  thus	  helping	  to	  discharge	  the	  collective	  social	  responsibility	  of	  the	  field.	  	  	  
	   Fortunately,	  there	  are	  many	  signs	  of	  a	  trend	  toward	  greater	  social	  engagement.	  As	  
mentioned	  above,	  participants	  in	  the	  University	  of	  Cincinnati	  Colloquium	  on	  Socially	  Engaged	  
Philosophy	  of	  Science	  spearheaded	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Joint	  Caucus	  of	  Socially	  Engaged	  
Philosophers	  and	  Historians	  of	  Science	  (JCSEPHS)	  of	  the	  Philosophy	  of	  Science	  Association	  and	  
the	  History	  of	  Science	  Society.	  	  JCSEPHS	  has	  released	  a	  Manifesto,	  reminiscent	  of	  the	  Vienna	  
Circle’s	  Manifesto,	  that	  is	  evocative	  of	  SEPOS	  as	  we	  have	  developed	  the	  concept	  here.	  	  Helen	  
Longino	  and	  Sandra	  Mitchell	  orchestrated	  an	  inaugural	  meeting	  of	  the	  caucus	  at	  the	  2012	  
HSS/PSA	  Joint	  Session.	  The	  meeting	  involved	  an	  enthusiastic,	  standing-­‐room	  only	  crowd	  with	  
diverse	  views	  in	  philosophy	  and	  history	  of	  science.	  This	  demonstrated	  the	  tremendous	  amount	  
of	  untapped	  interest	  in	  SEPOS.	  JCSEPHS	  is	  currently	  preparing	  a	  website	  with	  resources	  to	  
support	  SEPOS.	  Plans	  include	  a	  repository	  of	  relevant	  teaching	  modules,	  a	  section	  for	  public	  
discussions	  of	  socially	  engaged	  history	  and	  philosophy	  of	  science	  in	  a	  global	  context,	  and	  a	  
database	  of	  the	  public	  expertise	  of	  JCSEPHS	  members.	  The	  need	  for	  such	  a	  database	  was	  
underlined	  at	  the	  inaugural	  JSCEPHS	  meeting,	  where	  a	  representative	  of	  AAAS	  expressed	  the	  
regret	  that	  the	  organization	  did	  not	  have	  a	  way	  to	  reach	  out	  to	  philosophers	  and	  historians	  with	  
relevant	  expertise.	  	  
	   The	  establishment	  of	  JCSEPHS	  as	  a	  resource	  within	  philosophy	  and	  history	  of	  science	  is	  





purposed	  toward	  serving	  society,	  such	  as	  AAAS.	  Philosophers	  of	  science	  have	  recently	  begun	  to	  
reestablish	  a	  presence	  at	  the	  annual	  AAAS	  conference.	  Sandra	  Mitchell	  and	  Naomi	  Oreskes	  
currently	  serve	  on	  the	  program	  committee	  for	  AAAS,	  and	  Jane	  Maienschein,	  a	  contributor	  to	  
this	  issue,	  served	  as	  president	  of	  Section	  L	  (History	  and	  Philosophy	  of	  Science)	  in	  2012.5	  AAAS	  
supports	  fellowships	  to	  provide	  non-­‐scientists	  with	  the	  training	  and	  experience	  to	  take	  part	  in	  
advocacy	  at	  the	  interface	  between	  science	  and	  society.	  Similar	  advocacy	  support	  exists	  at	  other	  
organizations	  as	  well,	  including	  the	  Commission	  on	  Professionals	  in	  Science	  and	  Technology,	  the	  
British	  Association	  for	  the	  Advancement	  of	  Science,	  the	  US	  National	  Academy	  of	  Sciences,	  the	  
National	  Institutes	  of	  Health,	  and	  the	  National	  Science	  Foundation.	  Such	  opportunities	  to	  gain	  
familiarity	  with	  public-­‐policy	  design,	  evaluation,	  and	  implementation	  are	  tremendously	  helpful	  
for	  SEPOS.	  	  	  	  
	   Another	  opportunity	  to	  further	  SEPOS	  is	  working	  to	  change	  the	  incentive	  structure	  in	  
philosophy	  departments	  and	  the	  field	  as	  a	  whole.	  Many	  philosophy	  departments	  in	  the	  US	  
provide	  little	  or	  no	  professional	  incentives	  for	  philosophers	  of	  science	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  
general	  public.	  Indeed,	  as	  Maienschein	  notes	  in	  this	  issue,	  graduate	  students	  and	  junior	  faculty	  
in	  philosophy	  of	  science	  face	  a	  competitive	  atmosphere	  that	  tends	  to	  discourage	  social	  
engagement	  in	  favor	  of	  more	  traditional	  professional	  aims.	  Faculty	  and	  administrators	  might	  
work	  to	  introduce	  incentives	  for	  the	  social	  engagement	  of	  young	  philosophers,	  such	  as	  awards,	  
explicit	  incorporation	  of	  this	  aim	  into	  research	  initiatives,	  or	  an	  emphasis	  on	  social	  engagement	  
in	  hiring	  and	  tenure	  criteria.	  For	  instance,	  on	  her	  Notre-­‐Dame	  website,	  Kristin	  Shrader-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  The	  current	  chair	  of	  AAAS	  section	  L	  is	  philosopher	  of	  science	  Davis	  Baird.	  For	  more	  information	  on	  the	  





Frechette	  explains	  how	  she	  integrates	  public-­‐policy	  work	  into	  students’	  research	  by	  asking	  
them	  to	  apply	  their	  ethical	  and	  philosophical	  training	  to	  improve	  actual	  pieces	  of	  legislation,	  
such	  as	  the	  Los	  Alamos	  Laboratory’s	  1999	  Environmental	  Impact	  Statement.	  Young	  
philosophers	  might	  also	  be	  encouraged	  to	  participate	  in	  training	  programs	  in	  science	  policy	  and	  
education.	  For	  example,	  Arizona	  State	  University’s	  Consortium	  for	  Science,	  Policy	  &	  Outcomes	  
(CSPO)	  supports	  philosophers’	  participation	  in	  a	  two-­‐week	  science-­‐policy	  training	  program	  in	  
Washington,	  D.C.	  	  	  	  
	   Finally,	  philosophers	  are	  increasingly	  publishing	  and	  publicizing	  their	  work	  beyond	  
traditional	  philosophy	  and	  philosophy	  of	  science	  venues.	  One	  example	  of	  this	  is	  the	  open-­‐
access,	  online	  journal	  Philosophy	  and	  Theory	  in	  Biology	  started	  in	  2009,	  which	  has	  the	  explicit	  
mission	  of	  facilitating	  interaction	  among	  philosophers	  of	  science	  and	  theoretically	  minded	  
biologists.	  Another	  example	  is	  the	  AAAS	  blog	  Scientia,	  created	  by	  Manfred	  Laubichler	  in	  2010	  
with	  the	  aim	  of	  “[e]xploring	  the	  multiple	  ways	  history	  can	  inform	  current	  scientific	  debates	  and	  
contributing	  to	  more	  integrated	  perspectives	  on	  science	  in	  society.”	  Its	  articles	  have	  frequently	  
been	  among	  the	  most	  viewed	  and	  commented	  upon	  across	  more	  than	  300	  AAAS	  blogs.	  Above,	  
we	  emphasized	  the	  goal	  of	  accessibility,	  which	  ensures	  that	  work	  can	  be	  discovered	  and	  
engaged	  with	  by	  non-­‐philosophers.	  An	  increased	  interest	  in	  social	  engagement	  should	  be	  
matched	  by	  institutional	  recognition	  of	  work	  published	  in	  non-­‐philosophy	  journals	  or	  presented	  
outside	  traditional	  philosophy	  meetings.	  	  
We	  are	  optimistic	  that	  SEPOS	  is	  emerging	  from	  shifting	  attitudes	  in	  philosophy	  of	  





are	  taking	  steps	  to	  assert	  the	  availability	  of	  philosophy	  of	  science	  as	  a	  public	  resource.	  The	  
examples	  we	  give	  here	  and	  the	  contributions	  to	  this	  journal	  issue	  are,	  of	  course,	  merely	  a	  
sample	  of	  that	  progress.	  	  
	  
Resources	  	  
Philosophy	  	   	  
JCSEPHS	  listserv	   jcsephs@googlegroups.com	  
SPSP	   http://www.philosophy-­‐science-­‐practice.org/	  
SRPo/iSE	   http://srpoise.psu.edu/	  
APA	  committee	  on	  public	  
philosophy	  
http://www.publicphilosophy.org/index.html	  
Public	  Philosophy	  Network	   http://publicphilosophynetwork.ning.com/	  
	   	  
Science	  and	  Policy	   	  
AAAS	  Science	  and	  Policy	  
fellowships	  
http://fellowships.aaas.org/	  
AAAS	  Government	  Relations	  
internships	  
http://www.aaas.org/gr/about/intern.shtml	  
Union	  of	  Concerned	  Scientists	   http://www.ucsusa.org/	  
Center	  for	  Science	  and	  
Democracy	  
http://www.ucsusa.org/center-­‐for-­‐science-­‐and-­‐democracy/	  
The	  National	  Research	  Council	   http://www.nationalacademies.org/nrc/	  
US	  scientific	  integrity	  policies	   http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/ostp/library
/scientificintegrity	  
	   	  




Philosophy,	  and	  Science	  
Teaching	  Group	  
http://ihpst.net/	  
Center	  for	  Public	  Engagement	  
with	  Science	  and	  Technology	  
http://www.aaas.org/programs/centers/pe/index.shtml	  
National	  Coordinating	  Center	  
for	  Public	  Engagement	  
http://www.publicengagement.ac.uk/	  
	   	  





ASU	  Consortium	  for	  Science,	  
Policy,	  and	  Outcomes	  
http://www.cspo.org/	  
Boulder	  Center	  for	  Science	  and	  
Technology	  Policy	  Research	  
http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/	  
OSU	  Battelle	  Center	  for	  Science	  
&	  Technology	  Policy	  
http://www.battellecenter.org/	  
ND	  Reilly	  Center	  for	  Science,	  
Technology,	  and	  Values	  
http://reilly.nd.edu/	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